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Abstract
Software piracy continues to threaten the profitability of the software development industry.  Software
publishers have employed both preventive and deterrent controls and made small gains in protecting
intellectual property rights.  Although deterrent measures are believed to have a positive affect on profits,
preventive controls are reported to have a negative affect as the cost of engagement offsets company profits.
Commercial software developers are aggressively seeking economical methods of control to prevent piracy
through extensive licensing agreements, further elimination of physical distribution networks, and the use of
encryption-based software protection systems.   However, recent encryption-based efforts have received
negative responses from consumers.  With the tightening of controls, more users are turning to other
alternatives, posing a secondary threat to company profits.  In this paper we study the impact of network
externalities and the availability of open source software on the commercial software market when extensive
piracy controls are in place.  We use experimental closed-end contingent valuation to explore how the value
of commercial software is impacted by piracy controls and competing software availability.  In the complete
design, we conduct a 2x2x2 experiment and use survey methods to elicit consumer preferences in determining
how much students would be willing to pay (WTP) for commercial software under the following conditions:
1) high and low levels of network externalities, 2) the absence or presence of piracy controls, and 3) when
comparable open source software is available.  Preliminary results to pretest the survey instrument and
experiment are included in this paper.
Keywords:  Software piracy; intellectual property; open source software, willingness to pay, network
externalities, contingent valuation
Introduction
Software piracy continues to present a significant threat to the commercial software industry.  The Internet has provided a thriving
venue for many forms of piracy, creating an international dilemma for commercial software vendors.  Without a physical
distribution network, the Internet facilitates piracy by significantly reducing the costs and risks of physical transportation (Burk
1995).  According to the 1999 Global Software Piracy report issued by the Business Software Alliance (BSA), a trade group that
tracks software piracy rates around the world, one out of three programs used in 1999 was an illegal copy.   Although piracy rates
are believed to have decreased, total loss continues to increase as software sales and consumption increases. Recent statistics
developed by BSA and the SIIA (Software Information Industry Association) report losses of over $11 billion to illegal software
use in 2001 (InfoWorld 2002).
Social Issues in Information Systems
1Ç-Dilla (renamed Macrovision Europe) is a development company specializing in content protection, marketing tools and secure transactions
for digital products. This includes copy protection for CD-ROM and DVD products and the secure distribution of data products and software
applications from Web sites.
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Two measures have typically been employed to combat piracy.  Preventive controls such as unique software license keys are used
to prevent unauthorized access.  Deterrent controls communicate the legal ramifications of piracy to deter criminal activity.
Extensive research has been conducted on deterrent strategies based on deterrence theory (Gopal and Sanders 1997, 1998).   In
the Gopal and Sanders study, deterrent controls are found to potentially increase profits while preventive controls, due to the costs
associated with implementing control technology, offset or decrease profits. 
Another control measure has possibly emerged from within the software community.  The use of open source software presents
a natural control for software piracy.   Open source refers to an industry of shared software most of which is free for use or
modification.  As stated by Dan Kusnetzky, vice president of systems research at IDC:  
"With open source [piracy] is not an issue at all.  Under most of the recognized open source software licenses,
it is perfectly acceptable to purchase a single copy of software and install it on any number of machines, or
simply download it for free off the Internet." (InfoWorld 2002)
Open source applications are being used extensively outside the United States and have been identified as potential drivers for
cost savings. Although not all open source software is free, costs are usually less than those of comparable commercial software
applications. Users are also not required to pay annual license fees or royalties.  Commercial or proprietary software typically
require the payment of license fees to protect the intellectual property rights of the developer. As licensing fees increase,
commercial software prices increase accordingly.
Due to this cost factor, the use of open-source software is growing.  Government use of open source software within and outside
the United States has increased substantially, particularly by those interested in the cost savings associated with open source
applications.  This trend presents opportunities and threats to the software industry.  First, the use of open source software could
stem software piracy.  In some areas, software piracy rates are as high as 60 percent.  As a result, members of Congress have
proposed a bill that would require government agencies to use open source software whenever possible. One of the reasons cited
for the proposed legislation is to cut down on software piracy.
A second issue presents an immediate downside for commercial software developers. The recent use of tighter piracy prevention
controls, e.g. online registration and activation requirements, copy protection software or “spyware”, etc. coupled with increased
costs for commercial software has motivated consumers to seek software alternatives.  The response from consumers to
TurboTax’s decision to include copy protection features in their 2002 version of tax software has been negative, expressing quality
concerns and loss of customer confidence. Consumer reviews report the following comments:
“This has got to be the worst experience ever! The software is only allowed to be used from one machine; you
cannot install and print on another. On top of that, this software has spyware (CDILLA)1 that installs onto your
system, which runs all the time!! …I cannot copy CDs anymore; the spyware gets installed on a section of the
hard drive that could make your pc unstable!”
“TurboTax has performed well in the past, but this year it has failed to perform at an acceptable level. The new
TurboTax requires online activation. It also tries to limit software sharing and in doing so makes file storage,
back-up and retrieval difficult. I have been unable to re-open my work because of these protections and have
had to start completely over on a long return. TurboTax also seems a bit less user-friendly this year. I have had
to abandon TurboTax because of these problems and am now using TaxCut instead.”
“Tax Cut has been an easy transition and they have no activation/spy ware programs that stay active. I strongly
concur with the many negative comments from other experienced TurboTax users. Mossberg (Wall Street
Journal (1/30/03)) hates what Intuit did to TurboTax! And you will too. Don't buy it. Send a message to the
software industry that such outrageous "big brother" business practices are absolutely unacceptable.”
We are interested in the effect of piracy prevention efforts on profitability in the commercial software industry.  In this paper, we
employ experiments using contingent valuation to study the impact of network externalities and the availability of open source
software alternatives on willingness to pay for commercial software under high and low levels of piracy control.  The remainder
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of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 develops the hypotheses and discusses contributions made by this research; section
3 presents the research design and data collection method; section 4 provides the analysis and preliminary findings.  Concluding
remarks and plans for future research are presented in section 5. 
Hypothesis Development
Software piracy has been analyzed extensively in behavioral and economic research.  Behavioral studies have focused on the
social and ethical aspects of software piracy (Glass and Wood 1996; Harrington 1989).  Other studies have attempted to define
the nature and behavioral patterns of the software pirate (Gopal and Sanders 1997; Solomon and O’Brien 1991).  An
organizational study by Banerjee et al (1998) suggests that ethical context is the most important variable explaining ethical
behaviors for IS employees.  Further findings support a positive relationship between ethical behavior intentions, individual
beliefs, and the corporate ethical environment.  A recent study by Wagner and Sanders (2001) support these findings, suggesting
that an individual’s ethical and moral dispositions may indicate their likelihood to pirate software.  
Economic research has taken a complementary focus using theoretical models to evaluate software piracy and consumer purchase
decisions (Chen, Sims, and Teegen 1997).  Research indicates that a consumer’s final decision to purchase software depends on
three factors: 1) the cost of pirating software; 2) the price of the software, and 3) the individual’s reservation price. A purchase
decision will be made only if the price of the software is the smallest of the three variables.   The purchase decision can be
represented as shown in Figure 1:
Figure 1. Consumer Purchase Decision
In environments with low levels of piracy control, consumers are faced with the choice of purchasing or pirating software.  In
purchasing software, consumers can choose between commercial (closed source) applications or open source software. In
environments with high levels of piracy control, consumers face the same choice but with higher costs associated with engaging
in piracy.  Alternatively, the consumer could choose neither to purchase nor pirate software.  Considering the increasing need for
software applications and industry efforts to incorporate higher levels of piracy control, we anticipate more buyers willing to pay
for software. Considering the availability of open source applications, we ask:  What is the effect of piracy controls on a
consumer’s willingness to pay for commercial software applications given an open source software alternative?
From this position, we develop the following hypotheses:
H1: Piracy prevention controls may increase consumers willingness to pay for software.  
H2: Consumers’ willingness to use open source alternatives is affected by piracy prevention controls in the
commercial software industry.
Social Issues in Information Systems
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H3: Piracy prevention controls may increase consumers willingness to use open source alternatives even though
externality implications (learning capability, application availability) say otherwise.
We would test for the following effects: 
1) Adding preventive controls in the presence of (low, high) externalities and in the presence of open source alternatives
has (XX) effect.
2) For a product with (low, high) externalities, adding (low, high) preventive controls lead to higher affinity towards
(closed, open source software).  
In this phase of the study, we pre-test the survey instrument and run trial experiments to establish reliable and valid measurement
and experimental procedures for the complete study.  
Contribution
Few empirical studies in Information Systems (IS) have addressed the relationship between piracy and willingness to pay (WTP).
 Most WTP research has been performed from a marketing perspective using behavioral research methods that focus on the nature
and attitudes towards willingness to pay for public goods (Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002; Soloman and O’Brien 1991). Although
conventional wisdom suggests that piracy reduces profit for software developers, studies have shown that a reasonable level of
piracy actually promotes software sharing and development, thus increasing firm profits (Osorio 2002).  Slive and Bernhardt
(1998) support this position by presenting limited piracy as a form of price discrimination.  Their work suggests that software
developers may maximize profit by tolerating piracy to home consumers, most of whom have a low willingness to pay.  
Lack of prior research in this area supports the need to further evaluate the issues around software piracy.  In this study, we
empirically investigate how various environments (network externalities, purchase alternatives, and control levels) impact the
economic relationship between software piracy and software publisher profits.  This paper contributes to academic research by
empirically investigating willingness to pay for commercial software in an open source software environment under high and low
levels of piracy control.  Practitioners can also benefit from this study with a better understanding of the impact of increased piracy
control levels on firm profitability.
Methodology
Research techniques differ for measuring consumers’ willingness to pay. Contingent valuation (CV) is one of the most frequently
used methods for measuring and analyzing the value of public or reproducible goods (Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002).  Although
conjoint analysis techniques have been employed in marketing to model consumer purchase behavior, results are often whimsical
which questions the reliability of the method (McCullough 2002; Sapede and Girod 2002). Contingent valuation uses survey
methods to elicit consumer preferences by finding how much individuals are willing to pay for specified changes in levels of
provision of a good.  One concern with this approach is that external validity may be limited in that it provides little incentive to
consumers to truthfully reveal their willingness to pay because responses are hypothetical.  Response incentive effects can occur
when surveys prompt respondents to make inferences about the value of a good.  A recommended solution is to cross-validate
results using a variety of WTP measurement procedures.  Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) present a procedure for using
lotteries that yield lower WTP estimates than contingent valuation methods alone. In the full deployment of this study, results will
be validated by administering a second survey that will use lottery methods to determine the true willingness to pay of each
participant.  
 In this study, a closed-ended (dichotomous choice) contingent valuation method is used that requires respondents to state their
WTP for commercial software given repeated choices of whether the participant would buy the good at a given price. Figure 2
illustrates this procedure: 
Burton et al./Software Piracy
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½ Price?
No (47%)
¼ Price?
Yes (53%)
¾ Price?
No (72%) Yes (28%) No (35%) Yes (65%)
Anything? Done Done Max WTP?
$188 avg.
No (53%)
Why Not? Yes (47%)How Much?
$20 avg.
“Given the availability of Star Office, how much would you be willing to pay for Microsoft Office if the market
price is $180?”
Figure 2.  Flow of Dichotomous Choice Procedure
The figure includes actual results from the pretest experiment.  Percentages and prices will be discussed in the preliminary results
section of this paper.  
Survey data collected from experimental methods used in contingent valuation have typically been analyzed using the Multinomial
Logit model (Haaijer et al 1998).  However, problems have been associated with the standard MNL model due to assumptions
that the error terms are independent across alternatives.  The Multinomial Probit model (MNP) alleviates this assumption. We
propose using the MNP model to empirically analyze consumer preferences regarding willingness to pay for commercial (closed
source) software in the presence of piracy controls and open source alternatives.  In the following sections we discuss the
experiment designed for this study and preliminary results from the survey. 
Data Collection 
Given the issues defined above, we collect data in four areas:  1) perceived compatibility in user interface and data interchange,
2) user sophistication in terms of computer experience, 3) demographic data and other information to control for intrinsic affects,
and 4) willingness to pay responses.  A four-part survey instrument was developed to assess degrees of externality and to
determine an individual’s willingness to pay for a closed source product such as Microsoft Office.  Survey questions were
designed to capture degrees of externality, sophistication of user (computer experience), demographic information, and overall
perceptions about piracy and the administration of the survey.  The network externality construct was evaluated based on levels
of user interface and data interchange between the open source and closed source applications.  We ask questions to determine
specific levels of usability, interface, interchange, and bias.
The data used in this study was collected from a population of seventy-five undergraduate and graduate students.  Participants
were told to assume they are in the market to purchase a new computer.  Participants have two choices:  purchase a computer with
pre-installed open source software at one price; or, purchase the same computer pre-installed with Microsoft Office at a higher
price.  In this phase of the experiment, participants were warned that extensive piracy controls are in place.  They would not be
able to use previously acquired software or obtain copies from any other source.  Participants were then instructed to watch a
video developed for this study that compares Microsoft Office with Star Office—an open source alternative.  The video focuses
specifically on the document generation and editing features of Microsoft Word and OpenOffice Writer.  After viewing the video,
participants were asked to respond to the on-line survey.
Experimental Design
The proposed experiment involves a 2x2x2 design.  Two variables are used to measure externality levels. The first variable—user
interface—is varied at two levels and manipulated on a between subjects basis.  Participants in the study are provided with a
description of user interface (what is seen in each application and the keystrokes used for each task) and a keystroke comparison
Social Issues in Information Systems
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chart.  The second variable—data interchange—is also varied at two levels and manipulated on a between subjects basis.
Participants are again provided with a description of data interchange (how well documents transfer between applications).  In
the full experiment, piracy control and open source availability are both evaluated as independent variables at two levels (high,
low/presence, absence). 
For the dependent variable, we ask participants to evaluate their willingness to pay for the commercial application.  Prices are
presented as a dichotomous choice, incrementing above and below the selling price and beginning at different levels in each
survey.  
Preliminary Results of Data Collected
User Sophistication
We were able to characterize a typical respondent as an individual with 7 to 10 years computer experience, 5 to 10 years using
a word processing application, 5 to 7 years familiarity with Microsoft Word.  Although the typical respondent used a computer
16 to 20 hours per week, most did not currently use an open source application.  Most respondents were not familiar with open
source software.  After viewing the video, most respondents believed open source applications were generally more difficult to
use than commercial applications. However, most respondents believed open source applications were as reliable as commercial
applications.  In general, most respondents expected open source software to be comparable to commercial or closed source
software.  
User Interface and Data Interchange
Survey questions were developed to measure usability, interface, interchange, and application bias.  We performed a factor
analysis to determine how well the questions measured what we intended them to measure. Factor analysis results revealed that
respondents did not clearly distinguish between user interface and data interchange in the survey.  We therefore checked the
reliability of our survey instrument using Cronbach alpha measures.  Specifically, we wanted to know how well each set of
questions fit together.  Cronbach alpha measures ranged from 0.534 to 0.826 for the four categories and agreed closely with
loadings from the factor analysis. Alpha measures greater than 0.6 imply reliability. Overall results indicate a need to reassign
and reword 5 of the 18 questions to accurately measure the variables of interest.
Willingness to Pay
Data collected from the dichotomous choice section of the survey are summarized in Figure 2.   Preliminary findings indicate that
when piracy controls are high and comparable open source software is available, consumers are willing to pay no more than $75
on the average for Microsoft Office given a market price of $180.  WTP prices ranged from 0 to $350 with over 30% of the
respondents not willing to pay anything for the commercial application.  If findings are confirmed in the full experiment, this could
indicate that implementing piracy controls in an open source environment could reduce firm profitability by over 50%. 
Discussion and Conclusion
The first phase of this study serves as a pretest for the survey instrument and the experiment designed to evaluate measures of
willingness to pay for commercial software by consumers.  Results indicate that, with suggested modifications, the survey and
experiment will provide reliable results for the complete study.  In the full survey, we will capture responses from 200 MBA and
PhD students to have a sample of experienced respondents large enough to produce reliable results.  Modifications as defined by
factor analysis findings will be incorporated in the revised survey. We will use the Multinomial Probit (MNP) model to analyze
data.  
Preliminary findings indicate possible support for all three hypotheses presented.  Prior research indicates that a consumer’s final
decision to purchase software depends on the cost of pirating software, the price of the software, and the individual’s reservation
price. Initial results indicate that, under high levels of piracy control, consumers are willing to use open source software
applications given a market-determined price for Microsoft Office. These results hold in the presence of network externalities,
Burton et al./Software Piracy
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indicating that positive network effects through software sharing do not significantly affect consumer choice.  This would indicate
that the use of piracy controls for commercial software could adversely impact profitability in this industry.  However, further
study must be conducted to confirm these results.
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Appendix:  Sample Dichotomous Choice Questions
Given the availability of OpenOffice, how much would you be willing to pay to for Microsoft Office?
1. Would you consider paying $40?
Yes_______ (go to Question #3)
No ________(go to Question #2)
2. Would you consider paying $20?
Yes_______ (Thank you! You have completed this section of the survey.  Please proceed to the next section.)
No ________(go to Question #5)
3. Would you consider paying $60?
Yes_______ (go to Question #4)
No ________(Thank you!  You have completed this section of the survey.  Please proceed to the next section.)
4. What is the maximum you would pay for Microsoft Office?
______ (You have completed this section of the survey.  Please proceed to the next section.)
5. Would you be willing to pay anything at all for Microsoft Office?
Yes______ Please state the amount: ________ (Thank you! You have completed this section of the survey.  Please proceed
to  the next section.)
No_______ (go to Question #6)
6. I would not pay anything for Microsoft Office because:
____ I would use the free open source version that was provided with the computer.
____I would purchase a different bundled software application.
____I would obtain a copy of a previous version of Microsoft Office from a friend.
____other (please state reason):__________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
